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or some years public attention has 
been focused on the question of 
drug-related offending, whether on 
persons who engage in misuse of drugs 
offences, or drug addicts who engage in 
offences such as larceny, robbery and 
burglary. This has resulted in a 
considerable volume of new legislation 
and a number of proposed measures which 
may shortly become law. Without taking 
on board broader issues such as the 
decrimi-nalisation of certain classes of 
drugs, the relative merits of treatment 
programmes for addicts or broader 
sentencing issues, this article seeks to 
highlight a number of points in this area 
relating primarily to procedural issues 
which have remained, in the main, 
obscured by matters of greater topicality. 
The areas touched on include problems 
relating to search warrants in drugs cases; 
seven day detention; delays at the pre-trial 
stage; proof of possession in drug dealing 
cases; and some aspects of sentencing, 
including the proposals to introduce a 
mandatory minimum sentence for drug 
dealing and to establish a new Drugs 
Court. The intention is not to offer 
definitive conclusions but rather to flag 
areas which might merit further discussion 
in both the judicial and political arenas.’ 
these issues are not solely relevant to drugs 
cases as search warrants play a role in many 
other criminal prosecutions, it is frequently 
the case that drugs seized on foot of a search 
warrant relating to an accused person’s 
dwelling will constitute the cornerstone of the 
prosecution, and therefore these issues can 
become highly relevant in prosecutions in 
respect of drugs offences. 
has proved reliable in the past, without 
probing further matters such as the nature of 
the information supplied or the nature or 
extent of the risk to the informant if his 
identity were revealed. In practical terms, 
therefore, it becomes impossible for the 
defence to ascertain whether the objective 
test laid down in Byrne v. Grey has been 
honoured. 
(a) Confidentiality of Source There are, of course, at least two reasons 
why the confidentiality of informants should 
be protected. First, from a public policy point 
of view, there is a general need to encourage 
co-operation with the police, which might be 
significantly hampered were the identity of 
informants revealed on a regular basis. 
Secondly, in particular cases, there may well 
be a risk to the safety of the informant if his 
identity were to be revealed. On the other 
hand, the constitutional guarantees of the 
protection of the dwelling house and of the 
right to fair procedures suggest that the 
balance should not be tilted in one direction 
only. Without offering conclusions here, what 
is suggested is that achieving an appropriate 
balance between these conflicting 
considerations might be given further 
consideration by the courts, particularly in 
light of certain analogous authorities. 
It has been clear at least since the decision in 
Byrne v. Grey1 that a Peace Commissioner or 
District Judge who has been requested to 
issue a search warrant must have before him 
sufficient evidence to be satisfied that there 
are reasonable grounds to suspect that the 
person is in possession of drugs before the 
warrant is granted. This objective test appears 
to require that some factual substratum must 
be laid before the issuing authority to enable 
him to exercise his judgment and precludes 
him from acting merely as a rubber-stamping 
authority. 
In many cases, the Garda applying for the 
warrant claims that the basis for his suspicion 
is information from a previously reliable but 
confidential source. The Garda will claim 
privilege both at the time of the application 
for the warrant and at the subsequent trial in 
respect of both the identity of the informant 
and the actual information received from the 
informant. The usual practice at present 
appears to be for the issuing authority merely 
to question the Garda as to whether he 
believes the informant, and whether the 
informant 
Of particular interest is the Irish case law 
in the area of executive privilege in discovery 
applications on the civil side including 
Murphy v. Dublin Corporation,3 Geraghty v. 
Minister for Local Government,4 and 
Ambiorix v. Minister for the Environment 
(No. I).5 These cases suggest that a claim for 
executive privilege should be tested by the 
judicial authority before being granted. 
Moreover, they might suggest that the 
Search Warrants 
A number of issues relating to the use of search warrants have arisen in 
practice in recent times which, arguably, 
require either superior court clarification 
or legislative intervention in order to make 




(b) Use of Peace Commissioners burden would lie on the prosecution in a 
criminal case to justify, why the privilege 
should be upheld, rather than on the defence 
to show why it should be lifted. 
In a similar vein, but on the criminal side, 
is the recent decision of Camey J. in DPP v. 
The Special Criminal Court and Ward6 in 
judicial, review proceedings in respect of an 
order of the Special Criminal Court. It will be 
recalled that the prosecution in this case’ had 
in its possession a number of documents 
generated in the course of the investigation 
into the murder of Veronica Guerin, which it 
did not wish to disclose to the defence on the 
basis that to do so would jeopardise the safety 
of certain persons interviewed by the Gardai. 
The defence objected that it was necessary 
for them to view these documents in order to 
assess whether they contained any 
information relevant to the defence. The 
Special Criminal Court ruled that some of the 
documents should be shown to the defence 
lawyers but not to the accused himself. In the 
High Court, Camey J. quashed this ruling and 
held that the appropriate procedure was for 
the trial judge (or judges as in this case) to 
view the documents and decide whether 
disclosure was appropriate. This seems to be 
a suitable way to deal with claims of 
privilege in that the ultimate decision is in the 
hands of a judicial authority rather than the 
prosecution. Carney J relied, inter alia, on the 
English Court of Appeal decision in Davis’ 
concerning issues of disclosure and police 
informants. By analogy, it is arguable that in 
applications for search warrants in drugs 
cases, the District Judge or Peace 
Commissioner should be told in full the 
reasons for not wishing to disclose the 
source, should be informed of the source’s 
identity and the facts grounding the suspicion 
as given by the source, and should make his 
assessment on the basis of that information. 
Also of relevance in the area are superior 
court pronouncements regarding the 
hierarchy of constitutional rights and the 
respective roles of different rights within that 
hierarchy. It has been stated, for example, 
that the right of the accused to fair procedures 
is higher in the hierarchy of rights than that of 
the public interest in the prosecution of 
crime, although it would also appear that the 
right to life (and therefore, perhaps, the 
protection of the safety of an informant) takes 
priority over other rights.8 Such cases may 
also be of relevance in considering a claim of 
confidentiality in a search warrant case. 
Another area which might require some 
further scrutiny is the widespread use of 
Peace Commissioners to obtain drugs and 
other   search   warrants.    Peace 
Commissioners are of course not judicial 
authorities in any sense, nor have they nec-
essarily any legal training of any kind. This 
alone might raise concerns as to the appro-
priateness of using such arbiters of whether a 
person’s dwelling house should be entered 
without consent, but there are also other 
problems which have arisen in practice. 
At time of writing, the prosecution 
practice is not to call the Peace 
Commissioner as a witness in the subsequent 
trial unless there is some obvious defect on 
the warrant relating to the Peace 
Commissioner’s jurisdiction. The information 
grounding the search warrant and the search 
warrant itself are exhibits in the case, but the 
defence are usually, therefore, precluded 
from cross-examining the Peace 
Commissioner as to how he exercised his 
power to issue a warrant. A number of 
questions have arisen: 
the difficulties that arise when printed forms 
relating to search warrants are filled out 
carelessly. In this respect, the judgments in 
the High Court Dunne9 case and the Court of 
Criminal Appeal decision in Baife10 are not 
easy to reconcile. In Dunne, the importance 
of the dwelling was stressed as a reason for 
requiring total accuracy on the face of 
warrants, whereas in Balfe it was held that a 
warrant which did not fully correspond with 
the grounding information and did not 
specify the stolen goods to be seized was 
valid. Also, notwithstanding the decision in 
Kenny” which clarifies the concept of 
deliberate and conscious breaches of 
constitutional rights, there are still some 
lingering doubts about how to reconcile 
Kenny with O’Brien’1 when errors on the face 
of a search warrant are the result of 
inadvertence or a slip. 
(d) District Court Applications for 
Warrants 
A final issue relating to search warrants is 
the fact that the proceedings in which the 
warrant is obtained, even in the District 
Court, are not recorded by a stenographer. 
Accordingly, if, as frequently happens, a 
Garda states in evidence at the trial that he, in 
addition to his sworn written information, 
gave additional oral evidence to the District 
Court (or Peace Commissioner), there is no 
way in which the defence can test the 
veracity of this allegation with reference to a 
written record. As in the Yamanoha” case, 
the issue may have to be resolved by 
comparing the oral evidence of the Peace 
Commissioner with that of the Garda. It 
seems unsatisfactory that such an important 
stage of the proceedings should go 
unrecorded. 
(i) Is the evidence of the Peace 
Commissioner required in order to show 
what his state of mind was when issuing 
the warrant? 
(ii) Is the evidence of the Peace 
Commissioner required in order to prove 
his own signature on the warrant in order 
to render the document admissible? Also, 
frequently, the form of warrant used by 
Peace Commissioners for the search 
warrant merely records the fact that he is 
a Peace Commissioner but fails to record 
for what area he acts as Peace 
Commissioner. This leads to the related 
questions; 
Seven Day Detention 
The  Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act, 1996 confers on the Gardai the third 
major power of detention for investigation 
under Irish law, the other two being detention 
under Section 30 of the Offences Against the 
State Act,1939 and Section 4 of the Criminal 
Justice Act, 1984. The power relates to 
persons suspected of involvement in drug-
trafficking offences, which is defined in 
Section 3(1) of the Criminal Justice Act, 
1994. As is well known, the powers exercised 
in full permit an appropriate suspect to be 
(iii) Is a warrant valid where it fails to show 
the jurisdiction of the Peace 
Commissioner on its face? 
(iv) If invalid, can this invalidity be cured by 
evidence at the trial by the Peace 
Commissioner to the effect that he does 
in fact have jurisdiction in the area in 
which the warrant was issued? There 
have been various rulings in relation to 
some of these issues by the trial courts, 
but definitive judgments by the superior 
courts will be required before the 
position is clarified. 
(c) Use of Printed Forms and 
Inadvertent Errors 
In passing, it is also worth mentioning 
place to support such recordings,15 in fact 
such recording of interviews is only available 
in a very limited number of Garda stations. 
Of course it would be naive to think that 
recording of interviews will solve all disputes 
arising out of interviews with suspects, as 
incidents taking place outside the recorded 
inter-’view will remain potential areas of 
dispute. However, it is an important 
safeguard which would address at least one 
area of potential dispute, namely the 
interview itself. Given the far-reaching nature 
of the provisions of the 1996 Act, it is 
alarming that the immediate introduction of 
the relevant technology on a widespread basis 
was not thought necessary. Here, significant 
inroads into an accused’s rights have not been 
matched by safeguards to prevent 
miscarriages of justice. 
detained for investigation for a full seven 
days. 
although there have been numerous judicial 
appointments in the last three years, at most 
one extra Circuit Court judge has been 
diverted to deal with criminal cases in the 
Dublin area. There are usually two trial 
judges available to take trials on any given 
day. This in turn may not, however, be a 
problem relating to lack of available judges, 
but rather due to the lack of available 
courtrooms. Criminal courts of course require 
special facilities and there are sometimes 
more judges than courts available. 
Section 7 of the Drug Trafficking Act, 
1996 also significantly affects the right to 
silence of a suspect in this situation. It makes 
provision for the drawing of inferences from 
the failure of an accused charged with a drug 
trafficking offence to mention a particular 
fact when questioned. This particular fact is 
one which the accused subsequently relies on 
in his defence and which he could reasonably 
have been expected to mention when being 
questioned by the Gardai. The Gardai must of 
course tell the accused in ordinary language 
what the effect of failure to mention such a 
fact might be. The effect of the section is that 
the trial court may draw such inferences from 
the accused’s failure to mention the fact as 
appear proper in the proceedings. The failure 
may be treated as corroborative of any 
evidence in relation to which the failure is 
material, although a person cannot be 
convicted of an offence solely on the basis of 
an inference drawn from the failure. 
In any event, the substantial delays appear 
to be not in the Circuit Court but at the earlier 
stage between charging and returning for 
trial. In this context, the proposed bill to 
abolish the preliminary examination 
procedure is relevant in that its intended 
effect is to reduce delays at the District Court 
stage.” In practical terms however, one can 
only wonder whether this will simply transfer 
a bottleneck from the District Court to the 
Circuit Court, or indeed transfer the delay 
backwards to the pre-charging stage, with the 
effect that persons will not be charged until 
the Book of Evidence is complete. The 
answer to this depends on the underlying 
reason for the delays in the District Court. 
Delays in the pre-trial 
period 
From a public interest point of view, one of the concerns in the area of drugs is that 
accused persons may continue to offend even 
after they have been charged during the 
period awaiting return for trial and trial itself. 
These concerns relate to (a) drug dealers 
(whether addicts or not) continuing to deal, 
and (b) addicts continuing to steal and rob in 
order to maintain their habit. Until the new 
bail legislation comes into force, the 
apprehension that an accused person may 
continue to commit serious offences is not a 
valid basis on which to refuse bail. Unless 
there is an apprehension of flight or 
interference with witnesses or evidence, 
which is relatively rare, the person will be on 
bail in the pre-trial period. This in turn raises 
the question of delay in the pre-trial stage of 
proceedings. Quite simply, the longer the 
time between charge and trial, the greater the 
opportunity to continue to offend. The 
question of delay also has importance from 
the point of view of the accused’s rights in 
that he has a constitutional right to a speedy 
trial. Thus it is in everybody’s interest to 
subject the question of pre-trial delay to some 
scrutiny. 
Although restrictions on the right to 
silence are not unprecedented in Irish law, 
and the above provision is somewhat similar 
to the ‘inference’ provisions in the Criminal 
Justice Act, 1984, which were upheld in Rock 
v. Ireland,’4 Section 7 of the Drug 
Trafficking Act, 1996 goes much further. 
Sections 18 and 19 of the 1984 Act are 
confined to inferences which can be drawn 
from the failure to answer specific questions 
put in specific circumstances. However, 
Section 7 of the 1996 Act deals with a much 
more open-ended situation. The accused will 
have to anticipate what facts he is going to 
rely on in the event of being charged and then 
decide whether it is in his best interest to 
volunteer those facts at that stage to the 
Gardai. This provision is modelled on 
English legislation, but it is worth bearing in 
mind that the legal framework in that 
jurisdiction is quite different given the 
absence of a written constitution and it is 
questionable whether this ‘inference’ 
provision is necessarily constitutionally 
valid/Moreover, questions might be raised 
about the compatibility of these provisions 
with the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
It is sometimes said that depositions are 
the reason for delays in the District Court, but 
in reality depositions are called for in 
relatively few cases, and almost never in drug 
related cases. In any event, the Bill proposes 
to maintain the deposition procedure in the 
District Court. Moreover, it seems more 
likely that the numerous adjournments in the 
District Court are merely to facilitate the 
preparation of the Book of Evidence, the 
delays being caused by overwork and 
understaffing in the Chief State Solicitor’s 
office. Another factor in drugs cases which 
may also contribute to delay in preparing 
Books of Evidence, is delay in obtaining the 
relevant report from the forensic science 
laboratory. Again, this is due to inadequate 
resources, this time in the forensic laboratory. 
It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the 
proposed tampering with the preliminary 
examination procedure will be inadequate to 
tackle the root causes of pre-trial delay, and 
that either increased resources or more 
radical proposals relating to the preparation 
of Books of Evidence would be required. 
In recent times, delays in the Dublin 
Circuit Criminal Court, i.e. between the first 
arraignment date and the trial date, have been 
reduced, and at present an accused who seeks 
a trial date at the arraignment stage can 
expect a trial date usually within three 
working months. However, it is perhaps 
worth noting that 
Perhaps most importantly, the restriction 
of the right to silence combined with seven 
day detention must also be seen in the context 
of our system in which tape-recording or 
audio-visual recording of interviews with 
suspects is not mandated. Although the legal 
provisions are in 
Meanwhile there is another dimension to 
the resource problem, namely the relative 
scarcity of treatment programmes for drug 





would have thought that a better way to 
prevent addicts from re-offending after 
charge would be to- encourage them to tackle 
their addiction. Ironically, many offenders 
who ultimately plead guilty and then become 
eligible for and engage in treatment are 
deprived of the opportunity to do so at the 
pre-trial stage. In sum, delays in the pre-trial 
period have built up over the years and stem 
from a number of sources. A commitment to 
sensible proposals and a serious injection of 
resources on a number of fronts is necessary 
if substantial changes in the system are to be 
made. 
The Burden of Proof in 
the Criminal Trial 
Turning momentarily from questions of resources and procedure to the 
substantive law relating to drugs offences, a 
recent decision on the burden of proof for the 
offence of possession for supply (commonly 
known as ‘drug dealing’) is worthy of note. 
For the offence under Section 15 of the 
Misuse of Drugs Act, 1977 to be proved, the 
prosecution must prove that the person was in 
possession of a controlled drug and that he 
was so for the purpose of supply. The 
prosecution are assisted in the latter matter by 
the presumption in Section 15(2). The 
possession element is particularly 
problematic, particularly in the so-called 
‘container’ or ‘package’ cases. Must the 
prosecution prove that the person knew that 
what was in the container was a controlled 
drug of some kind? Or must they merely 
prove that he knew he was in possession of a 
container which in fact contained a controlled 
drug, with the onus shifting to the accused to 
establish that although he knew he had the 
container, he did not know that what was in it 
was a controlled drug? 
then slightly complicated by the provisions of 
Section 29(2) which provide that if it is 
proved ‘that the defendant had in his 
possession....a controlled drug...it shall be a 
defence to prove that (a) he did not know and 
had no reasonable grounds for suspecting (i) 
that what he had in his • possession was a 
controlled drug.. or (ii) that he was in 
possession of a controlled drug’. What is of 
concern here are two matters. First, it appears 
to be for the defence to prove these matters 
because of the reference to ‘it shall be a 
defence’; presumably, the burden of proof is 
on the balance of probabilities. This is of 
course more onerous than merely raising a 
doubt which is the normal onus on an 
accused. Secondly, he must prove not only 
that he did not know the relevant matters but 
that ‘he had no reasonable grounds for 
suspecting’ i.e. a negligence standard. The 
net effect is apparently to place on an accused 
a burden of proving that he was not negligent 
about matters which are crucial to the case. 
Until a recent judgment, there was some 
doubt about the interaction between the terms 
of Section 15 and Section 29; given the 
matters that the defence has to prove under 
Section 29, what did the prosecution have to 
prove in the first instance to transfer the onus 
to him to prove that he was not negligent? In 
other words, construing the two provisions 
together, what was the mens rea that had to 
be proved by the prosecution? 
as a result of Section 29(2), the only burden 
of proof on the prosecution was to show that 
the accused had reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that he was in possession of 
controlled drugs, but that they did not have to 
show actual knowledge. Indeed, they argued 
that the trial judge’s direction was unduly 
favourable to the accused. 
The Court of Criminal Appeal followed a 
decision of the English Court of Appeal in 
McNamara’9 and held as follows. The 
prosecution have an initial burden of proving 
three matters: 
(a) that the accused had the box/ 
container/package in his control, 
(b) that the accused knew that he had 
the box/container/package in his 
control and 
(c) that he knew that the box/container/ 
package contained something. 
It is worth, noting that this statement of the 
prosecution burden is in fact less stringent 
than even that for which the prosecution 
counsel had argued in the case. It does not 
require the prosecution to show that the 
accused had reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that he was in possession of 
controlled drugs. The Court held that no 
injustice would be caused by this statement of 
the prosecution’s burden of proof, because of 
the existence of the provisions of Section 
29(2). The Court went on to hold that since 
there was evidence on which the jury could 
be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 
each of the accused had, and knew he had, 
the bales in his control, and the bales did in 
fact contain a controlled drug, the trial judge 
was correct in not acceding to a direction. 
The recent decision in DPP v. Byrne, 
Healy and Kelleher18 sheds light on the 
matter. The facts concerned the retrieval by 
the accused of a number of packages on a 
beach at Ballyconneely, Connemara which 
were subsequently found by the Gardai to 
contain cannabis resin. The circumstances of 
retrieving the bulky packages were highly 
suspicious in that it appeared to be a co-
ordinated operation under cover of darkness, 
but it*was also the case that the bales were 
wrapped in opaque material. The trial judge 
directed the jury that they had to be satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused 
were ‘knowingly in possession’ in the sense 
that the accused knew that the bales 
contained a controlled drug of some kind. On 
appeal, it was argued on behalf of the accused 
that the trial should have acceded to an 
application for a directed acquittal in that 
there was insufficient evidence adduced by 
the prosecution to prove that the accused 
knew that what was in the packages was a 
controlled drug, as distinct from some other 
illegal material such as firearms or 
contraband. The prosecution argued that 
The Court of Criminal Appeal has in this 
judgment provided us with a definitive 
interpretation of the interaction between 
Section 15 and Section 29(2), and moreover 
the interpretation makes sense of those 
provisions and is undoubtedly what was 
intended by the framers of the legislation, 
who modelled it on English legislation. 
However, it may be that the legislation does 
not take into account constitutional 
imperatives in this jurisdiction concerning the 
burden of proof and is therefore 
constitutionally suspect. The net effect of the 
legislation, as interpreted in this judgment, is 
to transfer to the accused the burden of proof 
in relation to a significant matter (perhaps the 
most significant matter), namely whether the 
^accused knew he was in possession of3 
controlled drug. It seems to involve a clear 
transfer of the legal burden of proof and not 
merely the evidential bur- 
The question is in the first instance posed 
by reasons of the terms of the Misuse of 
Drugs legislation. Section 15 (1) provides 
that a person ‘who has in his possession...a 
controlled drug for the purpose of selling or 
otherwise supplying it to another...shall be 
guilty of an offence’. It is clear that no mens 
rea is expressly set out, such as, for example, 
‘knowingly in his possession’. However, case 
law and in particular the Murray case;17 
supports the view that, at least in respect of a 
serious criminal offence, a guilty mind or 
mens rea is to be implied into the offence in 
relation to any material element of the 
offence. The position is 
 
 
den of proof. minimum sentence precludes the Court from 
doing what it is constitutionally required to 
do, namely to consider whether the personal 
circumstances of the offender warrant a 
reduction in sentence below the prescribed 
period of ten years. If the proposed 
mandatory sentence is, on the other hand, 
marked by a caveat which allows the court to 
go below the mandatory minimum for 
reasons personal to the accused, it is difficult 
to see what the provision achieves other than 
an endorsement of present judicial sentencing 
practice.26 It appears that the proposed Bill 
deals with the sentence in its latter form and 
it may well, therefore, be of little or no 
practical effect. Of additional concern is the 
proposed linking of the mandatory sentence 
to the street value of the drugs. The Irish 
Court of Criminal Appeal recently, in the 
Gannon case,” refused again to countenance 
tariffs and particularly ones based on street 
value. One of the problems with street value 
is that it varies from time to time and location 
to location, depending on supply and 
demand. Is the value to be judged at the time 
of possession, charge, trial or sentence? Is it 
acceptable that the sentence might vary 
according to whether heroin is more or less 
expensive in Dublin than in Galway? And 
most importantly, how is the defence 
expected to test Garda evidence on the 
question of value? Value is also complicated 
by the fact that the purity of the drug is 
highly relevant in determining to what extent 
the drug can be cut with some other product 
and subdivided into deals, and again 
estimates vary, as do dealers in terms of what 
purity drug they tend to sell. In view of all 
these problems, it is suggested that evidence 
of the quantity, and to a lesser extent the 
purity, of the drug is * much more reliable 
and constant than street value, and should be 
more influential than street value in the 
sentencing process, whether minimum 
sentences are to be introduced or not. 
Another concern in relation to mandatory 
minimum sentences, particularly when 
related to street value, is that they may tend 
to encourage covert pre-trial bargains which 
are unknown to the Court and therefore 
unreviewable for propriety and fairness. 
29(2) is very explicit in its terms. However, 
in Hardy v. Ireland” the Supreme Court 
upheld what was interpreted to be a shift of 
the legal burden of proof as in accordance 
with the Constitution, which would tend to 
favour the current drugs provisions. It is to be 
hoped that a full consideration of the 
ramifications of the drugs legislation will 
eventually be undertaken in this jurisdiction 
in light of the constitutional position of the 
presumption of innocence. For once, it is not 
a question of resources but rather a judicial 
commitment to taking the accused’s rights 
and our constitution, seriously. 
It has been held, in Heaney v. Ireland 20 
and O’Leary v. The Attorney General21 that 
the presumption of innocence is of 
constitutional pedigree, being encompassed 
within the guarantee of trial in due course of 
law under Article 38 of the Constitution. The 
presumption of innocence entails the 
corollary of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
which therefore must also be seen as having 
constitutional status. Accordingly, legislative 
provisions which shift the burden of proof to 
the accused must be carefully scrutinised to 
see whether they pass constitutional muster. 
In this respect, the Irish courts are in a similar 
position to the Canadian courts, where the 
presumption of innocence is explicitly 
recognised in the Canadian Charter, and, 
most importantly, in quite a different position 
to English law, where the presumption of 
innocence, although clearly a fundamental 
principle, may be altered by statute without 
reference to constitutional norms. It is worth 
noting that there is considerable Canadian 
case law on the question of when a legislative 
interference with the presumption of 
innocence is permissible, which might be of 
assistance to the Irish courts in this area. In 
particular, the foundation stone for this area 
of law was the decision in Oakes,11 where the 
Supreme Court of Canada struck down a 
reverse onus provision in drugs legislation, 
on the basis that it infringed the presumption 
of innocence in a manner which could not be 
said to be necessary in a democratic society. 
If it were to fall to an Irish court to rule on 
the constitutionality of the drugs legislation, 
the appropriate question might be whether the 
casting of a legal burden of proof on an 
accused to establish that he was not 
negligent, is the least restrictive way of 
meeting the problems of proof of knowledge 
that undoubtedly beset the prosecution in 
these types of cases. 
Sentencing 
The area of sentencing offenders and sentencing drug-related offenders in 
particular is vast. Out of this larger picture 
certain features have been selected here by 
reason of their having been the subject of 
some public discussion in recent times. 
(a) Mandatory Minimum Sentence 
for Drug Dealing 
Anticipating a possible constitutional 
challenge to the drugs legislation, there is 
limited Irish authority on burden-shifting 
provisions. In O’Leary, both the High Court 
and Supreme Court upheld provisions in the 
Offences Against the State legislation but it is 
important to note that they did so on the basis 
of applying the presumption of 
constitutionality and that in so doing, they 
interpreted the statute to shift the evidential 
burden of proof only. This option may not be 
available in respect of the drugs legislation, 
because Section 
In relation to sentences for drug dealing, it is 
worth noting at the outset that the Irish courts 
do not operate an explicit tariff system of 
sentencing. Thus there is no starting point or 
bench mark for any offence, let alone the 
offence of possession or importation for 
supply. It is also worth noting that the 
Supreme Court has made it clear that 
constitutional guarantees of trial in due 
course of law apply to sentencing, and these 
require not only that the sentencing court 
have regard to the public interest and 
questions of deterrence, but also to the 
personal circumstances of each individual 
offender and his prospects for rehabilitation.24 
It is in this context that the proposed 
mandatory minimum sentence of ten years 
imprisonment falls to be considered. 
The only serious criminal offence for 
“which there is a mandatory sentence is 
murder, and indeed the Law Reform 
Commission have recommended the abolition 
of mandatory sentences for indictable 
offences and have urged that no further 
mandatory sentences for serious offences be 
introduced.” Calls in other areas, notably 
sexual offences, for mandatory minimum 
sentences have been greeted with resistance 
on the ground of possible unconstitutionality. 
The net objection is that a mandatory 
(b) A New Drugs Court 
For some years the vast majority of 
offenders before the Dublin Circuit Criminal 






Shaw [1982] IR 1, Burke v. Centre Inde-
pendent Television Plc [1994] 2 I 75 and 
DPP v. Delaney [1998] 1 ILRM 507 
and that Court has substantial experience in 
dealing with them. The Court currently 
sentences in accordance with the Supreme 
Court’s view that the personal circumstances 
of the offender must be fully taken into 
account, and has developed an extremely 
humane and constructive approach to addicts, 
giving great encouragement to addicts who 
genuinely attempt to rehabilitate themselves. 
It does so in the face of a frustrating and 
chronic lack of resources at many levels. 
Some of these have been mentioned above, 
but it is also worth highlighting at this point 
the resource problems facing the probation 
service. At present, a probation report can 
only be obtained four working months after a 
Court orders its preparation and many 
sentences are delayed for this period 
following a guilty plea. Moreover, because of 
the absence of any kind of parole board 
system in this jurisdiction, together with a 
chaotic temporary and early release system, 
that Court has taken it upon itself to structure 
sentences in such a way that offenders are 
encouraged to beat their addiction under the 
supervision of the Court. A flexible approach 
is used, incorporating sentence reviews and 
suspended sentences with conditions relating 
to attendance at treatment programmes. 
as an alternative to the ordinary courts is 
surely bound to lead to problems of 
classification, for example as between addicts 
and non-addicts, with resultant problems of 
proof. It may indeed prove unworkable given 
that many dealers are also addicts and the 
reality is that these categories are not distinct. 
This writer is hampered by a lack of detailed 
knowledge of the proposals in respect of the 
new Drugs Court, and by a lack of knowledge 
as to whether such a Court might be a viable 
alternative to the District Court, but would 
urge that the above matters be considered 
when deciding whether such a new entity is 
warranted, at least if significant inroads are to 
be made into the Circuit Court sentencing 
jurisdiction. 
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1984, Criminal Justice Act 1984 
(Electronic Recording of Interviews 
Regulations 1997 
16 The Criminal Justice (No. 2) Bill, 199^ 
provides that where an accused is before 
the District Court charged with an 
indictable offence, the court ‘shall send 
the accused forward for trial to the court 
before (which he is to stand trial’, with 
certain exceptions. If the DPP refuses to 
consent to sending forward, the District 
Court ‘shall’ strike out the proceedings, 
although the DPP may bring 
proceedings against the accused at a 
future date. The Book of Evidence is to 
be served within 42 days of the accused 
being sent forward, although there is a 
provision for extensions of this period 
of time. 
Conclusion 
Public outrage and anger at the drugs problem in our society has indirectly led 
to a number of legal developments in recent 
times. These have included increased Garda 
powers to investigate drug-related crime and 
measures to deal more severely with those 
accused of or convicted of such offences. 
Few structural changes have been introduced 
to deal with the sheer increase in volume of 
drug-related crime and its effect on the 
criminal justice system as a whole, and 
problems stemming from resource issues are 
being neglected. Moreover, in the current 
climate of opinion there is a real risk that 
long established protections for persons 
accused of crime will fall by the wayside. 
Neither the interests of efficiency nor justice 
are being served by this one-sided, 
reactionary approach to the drugs problem. 
In this context, one wonders what 
improvement would be represented by the 
establishment of a new Drugs Court. If the 
intention is to set up a Court with a special 
rehabilitative philosophy, it would appear 
that such a Court already exists, but that its 
attempts are being hampered by a lack of 
resources. If the intention is rather to 
introduce some kind of fast-track system for 
drugs cases to reduce delays, questions might 
be raised why drugs cases would necessarily 
be first in line for this special treatment. 
Other non-drugs cases subject to the 
‘ordinary’ delays can create enormous stress 
for the victims of crime, such as sexual 
offence cases (particularly those involving 
children), dangerous driving causing death, 
and, of course, murder. (Indeed it is ironic 
that child sexual abuse cases encounter the 
greatest delays simply because there is only 
one video-link court serving the whole 
country). Moreover, cases where an accused 
is in custody have always been given as early 
a trial date as possible. Is a person accused of 
a drugs offence who is on bail entitled to a 
speedier trial than a person in custody 
awaiting trial for murder or rape? 
Furthermore, the channelling of offenders 
into a Drugs Court 
17 [1977] IR 360 
18 Court of Criminal Appeal, Unreported, 
17th December 1997 
19 [1998] 87Cr.App-R.246 
20 [1994]3 IR 593, [1996] 1 IR 580 
21 [1993] 1 IR 102 (High Court); [1995] 1 
IR 254 (Supreme Court) 
____________________________________ 22 [1986] 26 DLR (4th) 200 
23 Unreported, 18th March 1993 
24 DPP v. M [1994]2ILRM541 1 This article is based on a paper given to 
a Conference of the Institute of Judicial 
Studies held at Dublin Castle on the 
30th April, 1998. The views expressed 
are those of the author only and do not 
purport to represent the views of the 
Conference itself. 
25 See LRC Consultation Paper on 
Sentencing, March 1993, Chapter 10 
26 See the Criminal Justice (no. 2) Bill, 
1997, of which Section 4 inserts a new 
Section 15A into the Misuse of Drugs 
Act, 1977. Section 5 deals with the 
penalty for this new offence, providing 
that the minimum penalty is ten years 
imprisonment, although the minimum is 
not to apply if the Court is satisfied that 
‘there are exceptional and specific 
circumstances relating to the offence or 
the person convicted of the offence 
which would make a sentence of not 
less than ten years imprisonment unjust 
in all the circumstances.’ Matters which 
the Court is entitled to take into account 
in this respect are listed, and if the 
person is an addict, the sentence may be 
listed for review at least five years later. 
2 [1988] IR 31 
3 [1972]IR 215 
4 [1975]IR 300 
5 [1992] 1IR277 
6 High Court, Unreported, 13th March 
1998 
7 [1993] 1 WLR 613 
8 DPP v. D [1994] 1 ILRM 435, Z v. DPP 
[1994] 2 ILRM 487, Larkin v. O’Dea 
[1995] 2 IR 485, O’R v: DPP, Keane J, 
21 December 1995, DPP v.  
27 Unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 
Ex tempore, 15th December 1997. 
 
